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CONTRACTS-CONSIDERATION-GENEROUS WARTIME PROMISE
ENFORCED AS UNILATERAL CONTRACT. On October 1, 1940, the
following editorial appeared in the Sharon Herald.
The Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc. of Sharon to-day took a
place among the outstanding firms of the Shenango Valley.
William Feinberg, Manager, announced that any employee
called to the colors through the conscription law will not
lose a cent in wages. The company is prepared to pay the
difference between the government wages and the amount
the employee received before he went to camp.
The editorial offer was repeated by the manager of the corpora-
tion before the plaintiff and other employees and was affirmed
by the Board of Directors. Plaintiff was employed by defendant
at the time of the offer, and remained with the defendant for
the next two years; then, having received notice to report for his
selective service physical examination, he enlisted in the United
States Coast Guard. After thirty-seven months of service he
returned to the Coca-Cola Company for two more years, and at
the end of this period resigned and began this action of assump-
sit to recover his employer's promised subsidy. On appeal the
court affirmed pudgment for plaintiff holding that the employer
was obligated by his" promise to pay the employee for his pecuni-
ary loss incurred during his term of service.'
The court's reasoning drew no distinction between voluntary
enlistment and conscription though the latter was originally
specified in the newspaper editorial.2 The appellant's principal
objection to the finding of contract was founded on absence of
consideration. This question was resolved in the plaintiff's favor
by a finding that a forbearance on'his part was exercised when
he remained for two years in defendant's employ under the in-
fluence of defendant's offer.3 Judicial notice was taken of the
fact that a large number of lucrative' war-created jobs were
available at the time. The court assumed that this forbearance
was asked by the defendant as the price for its promise to pay
the proposed subsidy and that a valid unilateral contract thereby
was created.4
1. Mickshaw v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc. of Sharon, Pa., 166 Pa.
Super. 148, 70 A.2d 467 (1950).
2. But see RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 24, comment (a), and § 19 (1932).
3. No attempt is made to treat plaintiff's act of enlistment as the con-
sideration for defendant's promise.
4. 166 Pa. Super. 148, 70 A.2d 467, 468 (1950). The court early regards
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The court in the instant case was faced with the vexing dis-
tinction between a gratuitous promise and a legally enforce-
able contract. The difference between the two rests upon
the presence or absence of consideration. To support its finding
of consideration the court cites two British cases.5 However, the
act which constituted consideration in each British case was the
offeree's enlistment in the armed forces; thus they are not
authority for the proposition expounded by the court in the
present case.6
The court refers the meaning of consideration to Section 75 of
the Restatement of the Law of Contracts.7 Assuming that the
other elements essential to the Restatement's definition are pres-
ent, there is no evidence in the opinion of the appellate court that
plaintiff's act was bargained for and given in exchange for de-
fendant's promise, i.e., that the promise was given to induce
plaintiff's forbearance or that plaintiff remained with defen-
dant because of defendant's promise. The bargaining is taken
for granted by the court8 Such an assumption is unwarranted
under the strict definition of consideration incorporated in the
Restatement.9 Thereunder the parties must agree that a specific
this transaction as a unilateral contract. However, it does not specify the
time at which the plaintiff accepted defendant's offer.
5. Budgett v. Stratford Cooperative and Industrial Society, 32 T.L.R.
378 (1916) ; Davis v. Rhondda District Urban Council, 87 Law Journal Rep.
(K.B. Div.) 166 (1915).
6. The court cites no parallel case in Pennsylvania or in any other juris-
diction in the United States.
7. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 75. (1932):
(1) Consideration for a promise is
a. an act other than a promise, or
b. a forbearance, or
c. the creation, modification or destruction of a legal relation, or
d. a return promise,
bargained for and given in exchange for the promise.
8. "It may very well be supposed-without in the least impairing the
motives of the appellant in making the offer or of the appellee in enlisting
-that some part of the acts and forbearances mentioned was bargained
for and given in exchange for the promise made." 166 Pa. Super. 148, 70
A.2d 467, 469 (1950).
9. See note 7 svpra. Fink v. Cox, 18 Johns. 145, 9 Am. Dec. 191 (N.Y.
1820) ; Pershall v. Elliott, 249 N.Y. 183, 163 N.E. 554 (1928). In Wisconsin
and Michigan Railway v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379 (1903), Mr. Justice Holmes
expressed the concept in the following language: ".... the other elements
are that the promise and the detriment are the conventional inducements
each for the other. No matter what the actual motive may have been, by
the express or implied terms of the alleged contract, the promise and the
consideration must purport to be the motive each for the other, in whole or
at least in part. It is not enough that the promise induces the detriment or
that the detriment induces the promise, if the other half is wanting."
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consideration shall be the price for a definite promise, and a
bargain relationship must exist. The fact is that the court has
not interpreted Section 75 correctly. A prerequisite to valid
consideration as therein defined, bargaining, is lacking since
there never was a contractual understanding reached between
these two parties. As explained by Cardozo, J.:
The fortuitous presence in the transaction of some possibil-
ity of detriment latent but unthought of is not enough (to
constitute consideration).'°
Defendant simply made a promise unsupported by consideration
as so defined.
Two possible explanations for the courts' reasoning can be
found through a review of the Pennsylvania cases on the subject
of consideration. They are both related to the fact that Pennsyl-
vania courts have had a broader conception of consideration than
that codified in the Restatement. First, within the scope of this
larger conception, Pennsylvania courts have, at times, included
promissory estoppel as defined in the Restatement Section 90.11
They have characterized such estoppel in terms of consideration.
But these terms are obviously not synonymous. However, since
their functions have been to achieve identical results, i.e., the
enforcement of the alleged contract, they have been considred
complementary. Their product being identical, their separate
boundaries have not been precisely drawn. 2 The Restatement,
on the other hand, has arranged consideration and promissory es-
toppel into two distinct and mutually exclusive categories, the
former with the bargaining requirement included under the
See Corbin, Recent Developments in the Law of Contracts, 50 HARV. L.
REv. 449 (1937). On the general topic of consideration see Ames, Two
Thebries of Consideration, 12 HARV. L. REV. 515 (1899), 13 HARV. L. REV.
29 (1899); also Corbin, Mr. Cardozo and the Law of Contracts, 52 HARV. L.
REV. 408 (1939); Wright, Ought the Doctrine of Consideration Be Abol-
ished from the Common Law, 49 HARv. L. REv. 1225 (1936).
10. McGovern v. New York, 234 N.Y. 377, 138 N.E. 26 (1923).
11. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
"A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action
or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the
pronmisee, and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if
injustice can be avoided only by enforcing the promise."
12. Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions v. Smith, 209 Pa. 361 58
Atl. 689 (1904); In re Converse's Estate, 240 Pa. 458, 87 Atl. 849 (1913) ;
Langer v. Superior Steel Corp., 105 Pa. Super. 579, 161 Atl. 571 (1932);
University of Pennsylvania's Trustees v. Coxe's Exrs., 277 Pa. 512, 121
Atl. 314 (1923); Riegel v. Haberstro, 151 Pa. Super. 539, 30 A.2d 645(1943); Thompson v. McEalerney, 82 Pa. 174 (1876); Rerick v. Kern, 14
S. & R. 267, 16 Am. Dec. 497 (Pa. 1826).
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formal head of "consideration" and the latter under the title
"informal contracts without assent or consideration." The Penn-
sylvania court, apparently under the influence of the confused
concepts of prior cases, missed the Restatement's distinction and
relied upon Section 75 in the belief that it was as broad in scope
as Pennsylvania's traditional view that "conideration" can com-
prehend what is more precisely known as "promisory estoppel."
There is, however, no mention of promissory estoppel in the
Mickshaw opinion.13
A second and more probable explanation for the court's misuse
of Section 75 is found in the different degrees of importance
which the Pennsylvania courts and the Restatement have placed
upon the "bargain" requirement. This element in the formation
of a contract has been emphasized by the Restatement.14 Pennsyl-
vania courts prior to the Restatement have given this require-
ment a position of only minor, if any, importance. 5
These two possible explanations for the court's misconstruction
of Section 75 are pointed up in Langer v. Superior Steel Corp.6
This case presented the question as to whether the promse of an
old age penson made by the president of the corporation upon the
retirement of an employee constituted an enforceable contract.
Judgment was given for the employee. The reasoning of the
court rested upon alternative grounds. Either the employee's
13. A number of Pennsylvania cases have employed promissory estoppel
in analogous situations involving promises of bonuses. These cases might
have supplied convincing authority for the court's conclusion. Langer v.
Superior Steel Corp., 105 Pa. Super. 579, 164 Atl. 571 (1932), reversed on
other grounds, 318 Pa. 490, 178 Atl. 490 (1935), see note 16 infra; In re
Trexler's Estate, 27 Pa. D. & C. 4, 17 LEHIGH Co. L. J. 410 (1936). See
also Scholl v. Hershey Choc. Co., 71 Pa. Super. 244 (1919); Snyder v.
Hershey Choc. Co., 63 Pa. Super. 528 (1916). It would seem by these cases
that the court could have found support for its conclusion. Emotionally the
coloration of injustice grows deeper when it is known that the Coca-Cola
Company received much favorable publicity from its promise. It would
certainly seem unjust to allow them to repudiate their own voluntary pro-
posal. This bias seems to have weighed heavily with the court in the instant
Case.
For general discussion on promissory estoppel see Boyer, Promissory
Estoppel: Requirements and Limits of the Doctrine, 98 U. or PA. L. REv.
459 (1950).
14. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 75, Comment (b) (1932) "Consideration
must actually be bargained for as the exchange for the promise. A state-
ment that a consideration has been bargained for does not conclusively
prove the fact...."
15. Rathfon v. Locher, 215 Pa. 571, 64 Atl. 790 (1906); Western Savings
and Deposit Bank v. Sauer, 343 Pa. 332, 22 A.2d 727 (1941).
16. 105 Pa. Super. 579, 164 Atl. 571 (1932), reversed on other grounds.(president's act ultra vires) 318 Pa. 490, 178 Atl. 490 (1935).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss4/9
646 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
failure to get a new job constituted consideration or his reliance
upon the payments (made by the corporation for four years)
created sufficient basis for the use of promissory estoppel as de-
fined in Section 90 of the Restatement. The first stated alterna-
tive is subject to the same criticism as the instant case in so fa)"
as absence of the bargain requirement is concerned. It will be
noted that the boundaries between Section 90 and Section 76
are blurred if, indeed, ascertainable at all in the Langer case.
Pennsylvania courts generally, as in the present instance, have
at least nominally adopted the Restatement of the Law of Con-
tracts. However, in the Mickshaw case the court has miscon-
strued Section 75 and ignored Section 90. It may have come to
a correct conclusion, but only in spite of the Restatement section
upon which it purports to rely. The transaction presents a clear
situation in which to argue plausibly for the application of the
Restatement concept of promissory estoppel. The promisor's
statement may have induced reasonable reliance by the promisee
-a matter of evidence-and injustice can perhaps be avoided
only by enforcing the promise. Although the court could have
reached the same result under Section 90, its present unhappy
construction of the Restatement creates unfortunate confusion,
and the purpose of the Restatement ".... to promote the clarifi-
cation and simplification of the law . . ." here remains un-
attained.17
FRANK M. MAYFIELD, JR.
THE PART OF THE LEGISLATURE IN DETERMINING THE QUALIFI-
CATIONS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR.-Until recent times the
courts had consistently held that the judicial branch of govern-
ment should have the sole power to admit attorneys to the bar.
The legislature, employing its police power, could prescribe rea-
sonable requirements for the protection of the general public,
but the courts had the ultimate power to grant or deny licenses
to practice law. Recently, however, the legislatures of many
states have attempted to play a more significant role in prescrib-
ing qualifications requisite to admission to the bar. Typical was
a recent Idaho statute:
... the following applicants shlzl be admitted as attorneys
and counselors in all courts of this state without being re-
17. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS p. IV (1932).
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